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Safe spaces for dykes in danger? Refugee law’s production of vulnerable lesbians  
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines how refugee law’s requirement of an essentialised 
vulnerability from women applying for asylum on the grounds of sexuality 
persecution, serves to reinforce transnational power structures of patriarchy and racial 
oppression. I argue that refugee law relies on and reproduces a discourse in which 
space and identity are represented as essential, static and separable from each other – 
so the claimant must prove that she is and always has been a “real and vulnerable 
lesbian” across multiple and very different spaces. Examining case law from Britain, 
Canada and Australia, I argue that the criteria used to test the identity of these 
applicants produces an ideal vulnerable lesbian subject that reinforces rather than 
challenges normative boundaries of the nation-state. Refugee law requires women 
seeking asylum on the basis of sexuality persecution to perform their identities in a 
way that shows they are ‘in place’ (Cresswell 1996: 4) among the receiving state’s 
good gay and lesbian citizenry. Being in place is defined by the courts largely through 
participation in the pink economy and involvement in normative intimate 
relationships (Binnie 1997), and in opposition to an implicitly sexually deviant, 
racialised other - the ‘monster-terrorist-fag’ (Puar and Rai 2002: 118) who threatens 
the state from both inside and outside the territorial and normative borders of the 
nation-state. As well as proving that she is in place among the receiving state’s 
lesbian citizenry, the asylum-seeker must also prove that her home state is a 
dangerously homophobic place where she will be always and everywhere unsafe. This 
normative requirement to prove her vulnerability out there not only reinforces the 
imperial topography (Katz 2001: 1215) of nations-states as the bounded, internally 
uniform building blocks of an artificially equal global landscape, but also has the 
effect of reinforcing racialised notions of western states as culturally and politically 
modern and superior, and non-western states as primitive and uncivilized (Puar and 
Rai 2002:118; Grewal 2005: 158). The production of an essential and vulnerable 
lesbian subject, who can be rescued by western states through the mechanism of 
international law, contributes to a broader liberal discourse that resounds with 
neocolonial sentiment (see Kapur 2005).  
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I use Australia, Canada and Britain as the jurisdictions to trace how the transnational 
application of refugee law to specific groups of women is used as a tool of exclusion 
and regulation at a scale that includes but also exceeds the purview of the state 
(Hyndman 2004: 319). Mapping out patterns of power and oppression along lines of 
race, gender, sexuality and other axes of social and political meaning brings into view 
alliances and schisms that are overlooked when the nation-state is conceived of as the 
naturalized scale and primary subject of international law and politics. As argued by 
Hyndman, ‘redeﬁning scale changes the geometry of social and political power’ 
(Hyndman 2004: 316). Australia, Canada and Britain are socio-economically located 
in the global north, but they are geographically dispersed in distant corners of the 
world. They each have a common law system, and as wealthy liberal democracies 
with a predominantly Anglo-European (or “western”) culture and population, 
mainstream media and political discourses often represent these nations as major 
receiving states for refugees  - as states who bear the burden of migrants out of the 
global south (see Castles and Miller 2009). This representation occurs despite the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of the world’s refugees are received by the global 
south (states defined as “developing” by the United Nations (United Nations 2010). 
As will be discussed below, there is a significant and consistent gender discrepancy in 
applications made on the grounds of sexuality in all three states – lesbian asylum-
seekers seem either absent or invisible. By exploring this particular absence and 
invisibility, this chapter engages in a kind of un-mapping that seeks to bring into view 
particular unseen connections between refugee law and the complex spaces in which 
it is lived (Razack 2002: 1-20; Pearson 2008: 491). As part of this un-mapping, I use 
the term ‘queer’ to refer to any non-normative sexuality (Jagose 1996: 72-101) and 
“gay” and “lesbian” to refer to the categories used by courts, tribunals and interest 
groups to refer to people who have same-sex relationships. My use of this 
terminology is an acknowledgement of the narrowness of legal identity categories and 
of the reality that not all queer women define themselves as “lesbian”, but might so do 
strategically when engaging with law. 
 
After first outlining my approach and looking briefly at the current state of refugee 
law for sexuality-based claims in Australia, Canada and Britain, I discuss cases to 
examine how refugee law, as applied in each state, produces an ideal vulnerable 
lesbian subject and a racialised, static landscape around her. The commercial, “gay” 
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standards used to test the authenticity of the asylum-seeker’s lesbian identity in the 
Australian Refugee Review Tribunal case of N04/48953 (25 January 2005) and the 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board case of X(Re) 2008 CanLII 83550 are 
contrasted with the approach in the British Court of Appeal case of Krasniqi v 
Secretary for the Home Department 2006 (D) 120 (Apr), in which the applicant’s 
sexuality was almost entirely erased by the court in favour of her identity as a 
vulnerable woman. In the final section, I analyze a number of cases in which asylum 
was refused because the court found an “internal flight alternative” for the applicant in 
her home country. Looking in particular at the Canadian Federal Court case of 
Franklyn v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 1249 (2005), I 
argue that the internal flight alternative is another means by which law is used to 
produce an essential vulnerability in lesbian refugees by treating their identity as 
unconnected to their spatial context. 
 
Approaching these cases in this way allows for an interrogation of the politics of 
refugee law, gender and sexuality beyond the court and tribunal cases. For while the 
relations that construct the vulnerable lesbian asylum seeker of course include those 
of patriarchy and homophobia, they include also those of colonialism, imperialism, 
capitalism and the other relational features of today’s global political economy. So 
instead of asking how the law might be reformed so that a higher number of 
“vulnerable lesbians” might be afforded refugee status in wealthy, liberal states of the 
west, we might ask how the western receiving state is implicated in the situations that 
have led these women to flee their home states in the first place. Does the reception of 
individual refugees relieve the receiving state of its responsibility to less prosperous 
areas of the world? Or does refugee law act as a tokenistic gesture, the emphasized 
charity that masks the state’s much broader responsibility for the relations that 
constructed a vulnerable lesbian identity? These are some of the questions that come 
to the fore when we stop taking for granted the categories with which refugee law 
operates.  
 
Placing the cases: The bigger picture of gender, sexuality and refugee law 
Reading the cases through the lens of critical geography, race and gender theory shifts 
the focus of analysis from the individual subject of refugee law, and onto the broader 
relations, networks and spaces that surround her and through which she moves 
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(FitzGerald 2010). This reading challenges the picture generally painted by western 
governments, media and liberal NGOs - a picture of “foreign” gays and lesbians 
fleeing vaguely defined but implicitly racialised “repressive regimes” to find 
sanctuary in tolerant, liberal, western states that open their borders as something of a 
charitable act of “human rights protection” (see Keenan 2010; Miles 2010). Such 
representations exist, in part, because of the very structure of refugee law, which 
demands a unitary, discrete subject who can travel outside her home country, file a 
claim for asylum and prove her identity. The Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 1951 was drawn up in the post-World War 2 era as part of a suite of new 
international legal instruments based on liberal notions of human rights and equality 
(Fitzpatrick 1996: 231). As part of this new world order, the United Nations system of 
world governance obliges state signatories to the Convention to provide protection for 
individual subjects who have successfully fled their home state, and are unable or 
unwilling to return due to a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion’ (Article 1 as amended by the 1967 Protocol). As the cases reviewed below 
will demonstrate, refugee determination revolves around the claimant’s identity and 
where she does and does not belong. Political questions around relationships and 
responsibilities between states, and between place and identity more broadly are 
removed from the equation. By turning to critical geography, race and gender theory, 
I am widening the lens of analysis beyond the individual subject to bring those 
questions into view.  
 
The question at the centre of my analysis is how refugee law produces particular 
spaces and identities that most queer women fleeing state-tolerated persecution fail to 
fit into, and what broader political purposes are served by this production. Critical 
legal geographer Nick Blomley argues that western modes of seeing – in which the 
world is presented as set before and logically prior to a disembodied viewer – are 
implicated in the production of a ‘geography of violence’, in which law’s violence is 
encoded in material landscapes (2003: 123). This western mode of seeing is one that 
assumes that particular legal grids of understanding are super-imposable on any space. 
Applying this analysis to refugee law, the Refugee Convention quite explicitly 
proclaims its universal application across the world map. Yet in reality, some areas of 
the world influence refugee law more heavily than others, and the effects of refugee 
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law are also uneven (United Nations 2010). From this critical legal geography 
perspective, speaking about a “lesbian” or a “lesbian refugee” subject does not make 
sense outside the particular spatial context in which that subject is located (see Binnie 
2004). There is no “global lesbian” and for refugee law to state that there is, is for it to 
take part in a western mode of seeing that is implicated in the production of a 
geography of violence – a mode of seeing, understanding and reproducing the world 
as already set out according to particular, culturally specific categories that purport to 
be universal (Sparke 2004; Coleman 2008). As argued by Michael Keith and Steve 
Pile (1996) identity categories and politics have implicit spatial frames of reference– 
so the category “lesbian” might make sense here, but be an alien concept there. Keith 
and Pile (1996) argue that identities should be understood as always contingent and 
incomplete processes that are constituted, in part, by the spaces of representation in 
which they are articulated. So refugee law does not simply discover and declare pre-
existing “lesbians”, but produces those identities by demanding that they be 
represented in particular ways. Refugee law is in turn continually (re)constituted by 
the claimants who come before it, performing whatever identity they need to in order 
to migrate from one place to another - thus law, space and identity are relational and 
cannot be considered in isolation from one another.  
 
As critical legal scholars note, the refugee is a figure that reinforces the a priori 
notions of territorially-grounded state sovereignty, and the state citizen as the proper 
subject of political life (see Soguk 1999; Tuitt 2004). The requirement of Article 1 of 
the Convention that the asylum-seeker must have moved outside the borders of her 
home state, allows the receiving state to make a decision regarding a foreign citizen 
without violating the territorial integrity of the home state. Indeed, as pointed out by 
Tuitt (2004), each refugee decision gives the receiving state the opportunity to re-
perform and re-assert its own borders, thereby reaffirming the nation-state system of 
organizing the world. Against this spatial background of discrete, bordered sending 
and receiving states, the refugee subject is defined by both her vulnerable, victim 
status (in fearing persecution in its home state and needing to flee), and by her agency 
(in successfully traveling across nation-state borders). By operating through a legal 
category into which asylum-seekers will either fit or not, the refugee system 
encourages a hierarchy of vulnerability and a discourse of genuine / bogus, worthy / 
unworthy migrants in need. This focus on the asylum-seeking subject, and whether or 
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not her fear is well-founded, distracts attention away from broader political questions 
of why particular subjects need to move outside their home states, and of the violence 
of state borders more generally. As Helton and Jacobs note, Convention refugees 
actually constitute only a small part of an estimated 175 million international 
migrants, many of whom are forced to move by a variety of disasters, including armed 
conflict, persecution, and poverty (Helton and Jacobs 2006: 3). So while states, media 
and non-government organizations focus on refugees, forced displacement that does 
not fall into the refugee category but which nonetheless involves massive trauma and 
uprooting, continues to become significantly greater and more complex (Helton and 
Jacobs 2006: 4). Refugee law thus must be understood in the context of a much larger 
problem of people being forced to move from their homes, and of international legal 
and political responses failing to address that problem. 
 
Lesbian asylum-seekers: invisibility and absence 
The provision of asylum for Asian, Arab and other non-European queers was no 
doubt not what the original framers had in mind when they drew up the Refugee 
Convention, which was aimed at providing protection for those in the communist east 
who might seek asylum in the western bloc (Fitzpatrick 1996: 249). However the 
political map of the world has changed since 1951 and today the majority of asylum-
seekers both originate in and move to the ex-colonial states of the global south – well 
outside the implicitly Anglo-American and European parameters originally envisaged 
(United Nations 2010). It is also now an accepted tenet of refugee law that sexual 
orientation and gender identity can constitute a ‘particular social group’ within the 
meaning of the Convention.1 Accordingly, individuals who leave their home states 
because they have a well-founded fear of sexuality-based persecution should not, 
according to international law, be forced to return there.2 While not formally 
                                                 
1 In the Australian context, this was first judicially confirmed in Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 
225; in the Canadian context in Ward v Attorney-General (Canada) (1993) 2 SCR 689; in the United 
Kingdom in Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department Immigration Appeal Tribunal and 
Another, Ex Parte Shah, R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah [1999] UKHL 
20, [1999] 2 AC 629, [1999] 2 All ER 545; and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
have had the policy that “persons facing attack, inhumane treatment, or serious discrimination because 
of their homosexuality, and whose governments are unable or unwilling to protect them, should be 
recognised as refugees” since 1996, see Kristen L Walker, 'Sexuality and Refugee Status in Australia' 
(2000) 12(2) International Journal of Refugee Law. 
2 Article 1A (2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 
22 April 1954) defines a refugee as any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
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enshrined in law, refugee decision-making bodies now also recognize that women 
asylum-seekers face particular difficulties in the refugee determination procedure 
(Anker 2001). Guidelines for the determination of women’s refugee claims exist for 
all three of the receiving states being examined in this chapter (LaViolette 2007). 
While there has been research published on the legal position of queer asylum 
seekers, and the particular difficulties they face in the refugee determination process 
(see Walker 2000; Stychin 2007), as well as research on the problems facing women 
claiming refugee status (see Greatbatch 1989; Johnsson 1989), there has as yet been 
little academic attention paid to the particular issues arising when women make 
refugee claims on the basis of sexuality.  
 
The most striking characteristic of sexuality-based refugee claims made by women is 
that there are very few of them. In Jenni Millbank’s study of over 300 decisions on 
sexuality from Canada and Australia between 1994 and 2000, ‘14% of the Canadian 
and 21% of the Australian clams were brought by women’ (Millbank 2003: 74). My 
search through decisions in Australia, Canada and Britain between 2000 and 2010 
yielded similarly disproportionate results – out of a pool of several hundred sexuality-
based decisions across the three jurisdictions, only 81 involved women claimants.3  
Considering approximately half of the world’s refugees are women (Spijkerboer 
2000), the imbalance begs the question: why they are so under-represented among 
claims made on the grounds of sexuality persecution? Queer and feminist scholars 
have pointed out the general invisibility of queer women subjects in the legal arena 
(Lacey 1998; Millbank 2003). Sarah Lamble (2009) argues that the invisibility of 
transgender and lesbian bodies in the legal domain may be an effect of particular 
modes of legal rationality that actively render queer bodies and sexualities 
unknowable and unthinkable. In the refugee context, there is also a historical legal 
presumption that queer bodies and sexualities are undeserving of protection (see 
McGhee 2000; Millbank 2003; Millbank 2005). This feeling was clearly articulated in 
the line of reasoning in Australia and Britain that queer asylum seekers, who could 
                                                                                                                                            
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”; Article 33 (1) 
states “No contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. 
3 This search was conducted in July 2010. 
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avoid persecution by being “discrete” about their sexuality, did not qualify for refugee 
status. This line of reasoning was overturned by the High Court of Australia in 2003,4 
by the Canadian Federal Court in 20045 and by the British Supreme Court in 20106 - 
in each instance, the court held that the need to be discrete about your sexuality could 
itself amount to persecution. It has been suggested that the gender disparity in 
sexuality-based refugee claims might be because women are less likely to engage in 
‘public sex’ than gay men, meaning that they are also less likely to be persecuted 
because of their sexuality (Millbank 2003: 73). While each of these arguments 
provides some explanation for the absence or invisibility of queer women asylum-
seekers, what drives my interest are the socio-spatial processes that work in refugee 
law to produce an ideal vulnerable lesbian subject, an identity into which very few 
queer women asylum-seekers actually fit but which serves other political purposes. 
 
Producing the vulnerable lesbian subject 
The overturning of the discretion requirement in refugee determination was widely 
heralded as an enormous victory for gay and lesbian asylum-seekers, and indeed for 
gays and lesbians in general (ILGA 2010; Keenan 2010). It is unsurprising that each 
key case overturning the discretion requirement in Australia, Canada and Britain 
(footnoted above) involved men rather than women applicants. The end of the 
discretion requirement means that those claiming asylum on the grounds of sexuality 
no longer have to hide their sexuality in their home country to avoid persecution. 
However, not having to hide your sexuality does not impact on claimants whose 
sexuality is invisible to the courts anyway, which as the cases discussed below reveal, 
is the situation for most queer women asylum-seekers. In the British context,7 Lord 
Rodger uses what he admits is ‘a trivial example from the western context’ to 
illustrate the rationale behind the overturning of the discretion requirement - namely 
that ‘just as male heterosexuals are free to enjoy themselves playing rugby, drinking 
beer and talking about girls with their mates, so male homosexuals are to be free to 
enjoy themselves going to Kylie concerts, drinking exotically coloured cocktails and 
talking about boys with their straight female mates’ (paragraph 78). The judge states 
                                                 
4 S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473. 
5 Sadeghi-Pari v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 2004 FC 282. 
6 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. 
7 Ibid. 
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that ‘the same must apply in other societies’, suggesting that he has some awareness 
that there are differences between ‘gay cultures’ here and there. The question remains 
however as to what the lesbian equivalent of Kylie concerts and coloured cocktails 
would be – while there is an identifiable (if highly problematic) “gay identity” based 
on participation in public, commercial activities aimed at gay men, there is no such 
identifiable ‘lesbian identity’ that the courts can ask women to prove. Instead, the 
courts use criteria adapted from what they use to test the identity of gay men. As will 
be explored below, the courts require “real lesbians” to either be participants in the 
pink economy and publicly perform their sexuality like gay men, or alternatively to 
have be a caring, and maternal woman whose sexuality is a secondary part of her 
identity.  
 
For a woman applicant to prove her sexuality, she must give details such as when she 
first thought she was a lesbian, all of the intimate relationships and feelings she has 
had with and for other women, how she managed to hide those feelings and 
relationships and what happened to her as a consequence if she did not manage, along 
with anything else that the decision-maker hearing the case thinks is relevant to 
authenticating her identity as a real lesbian. In the Australian Refugee Review 
Tribunal case of N04/48953 (25 January 2005), this involved asking a Mongolian 
woman to gives names and addresses of “gay locations” in both Mongolia and 
Australia, and to disclose whether she had yet acquired a local woman lover in 
Sydney. The tribunal then asserted that conditions for gays and lesbians in Mongolia 
had been improving in recent years, citing as authority the Spartacus Guide, a 
commercial travel guide aimed at western gay men planning holidays abroad. The use 
of the Spartacus guide as a tool in assessing the authenticity of a Mongolian woman’s 
lesbian identity is a good example of refugee law’s imposition of a wildly 
inappropriate grid of understanding – the implicit spatial frame of reference for the 
court’s gay and lesbian identity category is the plump pink dollar districts of gay (and 
to a lesser extent, lesbian) Sydney, where “gay locations” are indeed clearly recite-
able by name and address, where it is feasible to find a “local lover” once you move 
to the area, and where the choice of holiday destinations abroad is on people’s lists of 
concerns. The grid of understanding being used to frame lesbian identity here is one 
in which subjects have the capital and the desire to spend time and money on 
commercial recreational activities targeted at local gay and lesbian consumers. This 
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grid is not super-imposable on asylum-seekers, who are by definition coming from a 
radically different context – one in which they needed to hide their sexuality to 
survive, and in which many suffered deeply traumatic experiences when they were 
open about their sexuality. It is particularly inappropriate for women, as even in 
regard to the local pink dollar market, it is men rather than women who tend to form 
the majority of the clientele.  
 
In the Canadian case of X(Re) 2008 CanLII 83550, a Russian woman applying for 
asylum on the basis that she feared returning home because of her lesbian sexuality 
used receipts from the Toronto gay village in an attempt to prove her lesbianism. The 
Immigration and Refugee Board noted that only some of the receipts were for 
transactions paid by debit and or credit card, and that only some ‘had an air-miles card 
number on them’. When the applicant could not show any of her own credit or debit 
cards, and when the air-miles card on the receipt was different from her own, the 
board found that her inability to show with certainty that the payments were made 
directly by her meant that she did not make any of the payments herself, and that ‘on a 
balance of probabilities’, the receipts were collected only to embellish her claim. The 
applicant lost her refugee claim on the basis that she could not prove her true lesbian 
identity. She had also provided photos of what the board described as ‘several young 
women … just frolicking and having fun’, and ‘in one photo the claimant is kissing 
another female’ but that ‘on the balance of probabilities’ this was not enough to prove 
the applicant was a lesbian – or at least, it was not enough to prove that she was a 
lesbian who was vulnerable to persecution in the way refugee law requires. Also taken 
into account was that although she joined a local community centre with programs 
aimed at the gay and lesbian community, she did not join as soon as she entered 
Canada, which the board decided also detracted from her lesbian credentials. 
Extrapolating from the court’s decision, to successfully prove she was a vulnerable 
lesbian, this applicant would have needed to have credit and / or debit cards in her 
name, and have used them instead of cash to make multiple purchases - presumably at 
sex shops in the gay village; she would have needed to show photos of doing 
something more sexually explicit than kissing another woman, and she would have 
been able to prove that she immediately joined her local community centre and 
perhaps other public organizations aimed at the gay and lesbian community when she 
first entered the country. This “ideal lesbian refugee” would have needed to not only 
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be confident with speaking English and dealing with public and private services in her 
new, foreign environment, but would also have an excellent credit record and an 
assertive, gregarious personality such that she would have not only found a lover but 
been publicly affectionate or sexual with her and been willing to be photographed 
doing so.  
 
These cases show that the “ideal lesbian refugee” must prove that she is vulnerable to 
sexuality persecution in the receiving state because she performs her sexuality 
publicly. These requirements are demanded of her in the receiving state on the 
assumption that if she shows her vulnerability here then she must have also been 
vulnerable there. Apart from the obvious problems with assuming that asylum-seekers 
will be financially able to make “gay purchases” and culturally able to make social 
and community connections as soon as they arrive, the requirement that these women 
perform their sexuality in this commercial, public way also ignores the reality that the 
asylum-seeking subject has by definition come from a space in which it was unsafe 
for her to publicly show her sexuality. Her vulnerability to persecution if she is open 
about her sexuality in her home state is the reason that she is seeking asylum in the 
receiving state, yet she is required to overtly perform an open vulnerability to 
persecution in the receiving state once she arrives. 
 
The British case of Krasniqi8 paints a slightly different picture of the law’s ideal 
vulnerable lesbian. In this case, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision to allow an 
Albanian woman from Kosovo who was living in a same sex partnership to be granted 
asylum on the basis of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right 
to privacy and family life). Krasniqi was living in a relationship with another woman 
asylum seeker from Kosovo, and they were raising the second woman’s child 
together. In this case, the court took into account that because of the heavy social and 
gendered expectations for appropriate behaviour for Kosovar women, they would live 
either with their parents or their husbands rather than with each other. The court noted 
that Krasniqi had been ‘bigamously married off’ at the age of 15 to an older man who 
was violent towards her. Krasniqi’s history and role as a caring woman was a much 
more stereotypical notion of feminine vulnerability than was required of the ideal 
                                                 
8 K v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2006 (D) 120 (Apr) All England Reporter (Court of 
Appeal, Civil Division) 10 April 2006. 
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lesbian refugee in the cases reviewed above. The striking element of this judgment 
though is that the relationship between the Krasniqi and her partner is almost 
completely desexualised – their identities as lesbians are ignored, and they are instead 
depicted as caring women in a family relationship. Indeed, considering that there is a 
30-year age gap between the women, anyone reading the judgment might assume that 
they were in a platonic mother-daughter relationship, except for two instances where 
the court somewhat bashfully acknowledges the sexual nature of their relationship. 
First, the court says that ‘the characterisation of such a household for article 8 
purposes remains problematical’, and it follows this with a footnote stating ‘see most 
recently Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v M [2006] UKHL 11’, which is a 
case about non-custodial parents in homosexual relationships paying more in child 
maintenance than their heterosexual counterparts. Second, the court summarizes the 
adjudicator’s findings about their relationship that, ‘while it had a sexual component 
… that is not the central force’, but that rather, ‘their relationship is an exclusive and 
enduring one’ in which ‘a family life’ exists. Thus, the court accepted a model of 
lesbian identity that was desexualized, discrete to the point of being invisible, and 
normative in terms of both relationship models (of a long-term, committed couple) 
and gender roles (women as vulnerable victims of a non-British patriarchy and as 
primary carers).  
 
Krasniqi was an unusual decision because the applicant had her claim for asylum on 
the grounds of sexuality accepted, but it is clear from reading the decision that it was 
accepted because of her identity as a vulnerable woman rather than as a lesbian who 
did not belong. The court’s erasure of Krasniqi’s sexuality actually worked in her 
favour – considering her lifestyle as a mother and a partner in a long-term 
relationship, it would likely have been impossible for her to provide requisite proof 
that she was an ideal vulnerable lesbian. However, she could prove that she was a 
vulnerable woman instead, one who just happened to be in a relationship with another 
woman.  
 
In most cases however, the court’s refusal and / or inability to recognise the 
applicant’s sexuality leads to the failure of the refugee claim. As well as the cases of 
N04/48953 and X(Re) reviewed above, in which the court found that there was not 
enough evidence to prove that the applicants were genuine lesbians, there are many 
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cases in which decision-makers found that regardless of whether or not the women 
before them were in fact genuine lesbians, they did not have a well-founded fear of 
persecution because no one would ever know that they were lesbians anyway.9 They 
could not prove their vulnerability fit with the legally mandated version of what being 
a vulnerable lesbian entails. In an Australian case, the decision-maker proclaimed that 
‘the applicant has not satisfied the tribunal that she is homosexual, let alone that 
anyone around her knows about it, or cares to think about it, or would harm her for 
it’.10 In a number of cases, the decision-maker concluded that lesbians in the sending 
state could not be a group that are vulnerable to persecution because of the lack of 
public, court-admissible information about ‘lesbians’ in the sending state.11 These 
cases demonstrate that for women claiming asylum on the grounds of sexuality, the 
end of the requirement that they be discrete about their sexuality is somewhat 
irrelevant because the courts tend to ignore lesbian sexuality anyway. The case law 
suggests that unless they prove their vulnerability in the receiving state by, for 
example, being super-butch, making regular grandiose (preferably credit-based) 
purchases at their local sex store or taking a lead role in community lesbian activities, 
then the courts are unlikely to recognize them as worthy of protection in the refugee 
system. A somewhat blurry picture thus emerges of the ideal vulnerable lesbian 
refugee, arriving in wealthy liberal democracies. What is clear is that she is required 
to fit within a singular scalar narrative of vulnerability across multiple, divergent 
spaces – either that of the western lesbian or that of the foreign woman.  
 
Producing static places 
                                                 
9 See for example FF Iran [2004] UKIAT 00191 2004 (Immigration Appeal Tribunal) 13 July 2004; 
JD Zimbabwe [2004] UKIAT 00259 2004 (Immigration Appeal Tribunal); N04/49108 (21 July 2004) 
2004 (Refugee Review Tribunal) 21 July 2004; Gyorgyjakab v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) 2005 FC 1119 2005 CanLII (Federal Court (Canada)); 060531993 [2006] RRTA 141 (28 
September 2006) 2006 (Refugee Review Tribunal) 28 September 2006.  N04/49108 (21 July 2004) 
(Refugee Review Tribunal); Blanco v Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration) 2001 FCT 
727 2001 (Federal Court (Canada)) 28 June 2001. 
10 N04/49108 (21 July 2004) 2004 (Refugee Review Tribunal) 21 July 2004. 
11 See for example Amare v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1600 2005 
All England Official Transcripts (Court of Appeal (Civil Division)) 20 December 2005. FF Iran 
[2004] UKIAT 00191 2004 (Immigration Appeal Tribunal) 13 July 2004; JD Zimbabwe [2004] UKIAT 
00259 (Immigration Appeal Tribunal); DM Serbia and Montenegro [2004] UKIAT 0028 (Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal); 071261665 [2007] RRTA (12 June 2007) 2007 (Refugee Review Tribunal) 12 June 
2007;  Brahmbatt v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Patel v Minister for Immigration 
& Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1686. 
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As well as producing a vulnerable lesbian identity, refugee decisions produce a 
particular landscape - spaces in which some belong and others do not. The way that 
the courts test a woman’s identity is indicative of refugee law’s approach of treating 
space and identity as separate, singular and unrelated realms of fact to be proved or 
disproved – in N04/48953 (the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal case involving 
the Mongolian woman discussed above) for example, the use of the Spartacus guide, 
together with the requirement of detailed evidence of the woman’s sexuality 
stretching from her first and most intimate sexual feelings and experiences through to 
her attendance at ‘gay locations’ in the country in which she is seeking asylum, 
require of her a single, fixed identity across multiple and very varied spaces. This 
approach ignores the reality of the necessity for these women to perform fluid queer 
identity in a homophobic world. Eve Sedgwick (1990) observes that the need to step 
in and out of the closet on a regular basis, and to sometimes occupy a liminal space 
between is central to the everyday experiences of large segments of society. Treating 
space and identity as discrete and unconnected reinforces the idea of the state as a 
coherent, uniform space that subjects either belong to or do not. As Hyndman (2004) 
argues, ‘international borders can serve to naturalize difference, refuse political 
alliances, and obscure commonalities between discrete spaces and linked oppression’ 
(310). Many of the legal decisions cited in this chapter took note of the sending states’ 
attempts to prevent the type of homophobic and gender-based persecution being 
claimed. For example, in one case the court stated that ‘the Hungarian government 
has made serious efforts to offer protection to gays and lesbians,’ and to women living 
with domestic violence, and that the applicant’s failure to approach the police when 
her ex-husband and his friends allegedly violently beat her new partner and killed her 
cat, weakened her claim.12  Consistent with feminist critiques of the state and law as a 
masculine institution (see Charlesworth and Chinkin 1991), what emerges from these 
cases is how the state upholds sexual mores which exclude and disbelieve women 
who do not adhere to a particular type of heterosexual femininity. In refugee law, the 
state will accept only queer women who are vulnerable either because they are 
openly, commercially lesbian or because they are foreign women in need. Through 
the mechanism of refugee law, receiving states use the displacement of these women 
(both in terms of their gender and sexuality roles and in terms of their physical 
                                                 
12 Valoczki v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2004 FC 492 2004 (Federal Court 
(Canada)) 1 April 2004. 
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location) to reassert national borders, both territorially and in terms of what kinds of 
sexual and gender difference they will allow within these borders.  
 
Another way that the refugee decisions produce artificially static landscapes of 
belonging and exclusion is through the ‘internal flight alternative’ (IFA). The 
rationale of the IFA is to refuse an asylum claim when, regardless of whether or not 
the woman was accepted as a real lesbian, the receiving state can return her to her 
home state on the basis that she could avoid persecution by moving to another part of 
her home state. The courts use the IFA as a basis for rejecting claims in all three of 
the states analyzed in this chapter, though the test is most clearly articulated in the 
Canadian courts and tribunals. In the Canadian context, the test regarding an IFA was 
first articulated in two cases from the early 1990s.13 The first requires the decision-
maker to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility 
of the claimant being persecuted in the proposed IFA. Second, the condition in the 
proposed IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, considering “all the 
circumstances”, including the claimant’s personal circumstances, for the claimant to 
seek refuge there.14 What “‘all the circumstances”’ includes, however, differs with 
each decision-maker. Indeed, it might be argued that “‘all the circumstances”’ is 
something that a decision-maker meeting a foreign, purportedly queer woman for the 
first time, and in a highly artificial and formal environment, is never going to be able 
to take into account (see Millbank 2003). The use of the IFA is a means by which the 
courts construct the lesbian refugee as vulnerable everywhere in her home state 
(implicitly intimating that she will reciprocally be safe from homophobic violence 
everywhere in the receiving state). Of the cases analyzed for this chapter, there were 
only three in which having accepted that the woman was ‘a real lesbian’, an IFA was 
considered by the court or tribunal but rejected as unreasonable in “‘all the 
circumstances”’.  
 
One of the cases in which the courts rejected an IFA involved a Mongolian lesbian 
whose parents had denounced her, who had a long history of harassment because of 
                                                 
13 Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 1 FC 706 (C.A.) and 
Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.). 
14 re-articulated in Parrales v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 504 2006 
(Federal Court (Canada)) 21 April 2006. 
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her sexuality, and whose partner had been raped in front of her. When she went to the 
police she was met with hostility.15 Having accepted her evidence as credible, and 
having taken into account extensive evidence from sources such as Mongolian lesbian 
websites, news articles, United Kingdom Home Office information, Canadian 
Immigration and Refugee Board information and non-government organization 
reports, the tribunal concluded that ‘the applicant would not be able to avoid the 
serious harm she fears by relocating elsewhere within Mongolia. Indeed the situation 
outside the capital city is likely to be even less favourable to her’.16 Another case 
involved a Mexican woman who had been repeatedly and violently assaulted by 
police because of her sexuality, and who had already moved cities in her home 
country in an attempt to escape the persecution.17  The Immigration and Refugee 
Board had found that, being a ‘well-educated … capable, resourceful young woman 
… it would not be unreasonably harsh in all the circumstances for her to move’ to 
Mexico City, and, therefore, the courts refused her refugee claim because of the 
availability of an IFA. On appeal this decision was reversed – the Federal Court 
finding that considering her history of police abuse, it was unreasonable to require her 
to relocate to Mexico City.18  Finally, in a decision involving a lesbian from Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, a small multi-island state in the Caribbean, whose ex-
boyfriend had repeatedly and severely beaten her, an whom she still feared. She 
claimed that the police would not protect her from this man.19 The Immigration and 
Refugee Board found that the woman had an internal flight alternative of seeking 
refuge in the smaller islands of the Grenadines, which are separated from the main 
island of Saint Vincent by some 20 kilometres of open water accessible by boat or 
aeroplane. While the applicant told the board that her ex-boyfriend would resort to 
island hopping to seek her out, the board held that this part of her evidence was not 
credible.20 On appeal, the Federal Court overruled the IFA decision, stating that ‘it 
defies logic to believe that an island separated only by a few kilometres of open water 
from Saint Vincent and easily accessibly by ferry or plane could provide a safe haven 
                                                 
15 061020474 [2007] RRTA 25 (7 February 2007) 2007 (Refugee Review Tribunal) 7 February 2007. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Parrales v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 504 2006 (Federal Court 
(Canada)) 21 April 2006. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Franklyn v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 1249 2005 (Federal Court 
(Canada)) 13 Sepember 2005. 
20 Ibid. 
 17 
to the applicant’; further, that ‘the board should have known that these island are 
sparsely populated and geographically very small, and that it would be relatively easy 
to find somebody for whoever is bent on doing so’, and finally that ‘the applicant did 
not need to adduce evidence in this regard.21   
 
In each of the three cases above, “all the circumstances” included a meaningful 
consideration of the spaces to which the woman would be returning if she were to 
move to a different part of her home state. So in the first case the court recognised that 
small towns in Mongolia, despite being removed from the specific history of violence 
(including its perpetrators) from which the woman was seeking refuge, were not 
going to provide a space free from the threat of further homophobic violence. In the 
second case the court recognised that Mexico City is not big enough to provide refuge 
to a Mexican lesbian, repeatedly assaulted by police because of her sexuality. And in 
the third case the courts recognised that 20 kilometres of open water is not enough to 
protect a woman from a crazed ex-boyfriend, angered by her sexuality and on a 
mission to harm her, which the Saint Vincent and Grenadines police would not 
intervene to stop. Thus in each of the three cases where the law considered and 
rejected an IFA, there was a recognition that the areas of land and sea enclosed by 
state borders is a complex space, and that the ability of any space to provide refuge 
differs depending on the history and identity of the subject seeking refuge.  
 
By contrast, in the far more common situation where an IFA was considered and 
found to exist for the applicant, “all the circumstances” amounted to not much at all, 
with the IFA often tagged onto the end of the decision almost as a trump card, to win 
out over any possible doubts over whether the applicant should or should not be 
granted refugee status. An example of this use of an IFA is in a case involving a 
Mexican woman who feared persecution by her ex-fiance and her female lover’s 
husband, who was a powerful official in Mexico City.22  She claimed to have fled to 
Canada after being threatened with harm to both herself and her family if she did not 
leave Mexico. The board rejected her claim on the basis that she lacked credibility and 
that at any rate, she had an alternative flight alternative because her lover’s husband 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Avila Saldivar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 492 2005 (Federal 
Court (Canada)). 
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worked in the office of the Mayor of Mexico City, and, it was reasoned, his reach 
would not extend beyond Mexico City. After briefly reviewing the board’s credibility 
findings and deciding that they were not patently unreasonable (the standard required 
for their overturn on appeal), the Federal Court re-affirmed that:  
[f]inally, the board’s conclusion about the availability of an IFA is conclusive. 
It is eminently reasonable to assume that an aide to the Mayor of Mexico City 
would not have any reach outside Mexico City, however powerful he may be 
in the city and however corrupt the Mexican administration of police and 
justice may be. The applicant produced no evidence to negate that assumption. 
(Avila Saldivar v Canada 2005, FC 492) 
 
Thus, the applicant’s persecution is proclaimed to exist within the borders of Mexico 
City only, because the person she was most afraid of lived and worked there, and it 
was assumed that any fear the applicant had outside the borders of Mexico City was 
not well-founded. This assumption fails to take into account a world of circumstances. 
Considering the applicant gave evidence that her primary persecutor was indeed a 
government official whose jealous homophobic rage at the applicant’s relationship 
with his wife led him to demand that she leave the country, it could also be argued 
that it is eminently reasonable that he would attempt to harm her no matter where in 
Mexico she lived. Also, considering his threat was against both the applicant and her 
family, it might have been thought relevant to take into consideration where in 
Mexico her family live – if it is outside the capital then it would be clear that the 
threat was not limited to Mexico City. Nor was it taken into consideration that the 
stated corruption of the Mexican administration of police and justice might mean that 
it is quite feasible for a powerful official in one city to influence officials in another 
through corrupt means. By analyzing Mexico City as a place essentially unconnected 
to the rest of Mexico, the court thus found that the applicant was not vulnerable 
enough to qualify for refugee status.  
 
While the above example decided on an IFA to ‘any city outside the capital’, most 
decisions finding that an IFA existed for the queer woman asylum seeker directed her 
towards the bright lights of the capital city of her home state. Decision-makers 
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recommended women move to Mexico City,23 Harare,24 Bogota,25 Bangkok26 and 
Beirut.27 In some cases, these cities were explicitly stated to be ‘more sophisticated 
and more tolerant,’28 and with ‘a significant homosexual community’,29 underlining 
the assumption that the capital city is the natural place for a queer woman to be. There 
are several problems with this assumption. One is that it is based on a very western 
narrative of coming out and being queer – the story of the sexual deviant from the 
country who migrates to the city, where there are gay bars, sex shops and support 
groups. While sociological research confirms the city is a place where many adult 
queers in wealthy liberal countries find their homes (Weston 1995), there is no 
evidence that this applies across all cultures – sexualized identities and residential 
mobility does not operate identically across all cultures and places. Second, there is 
the problematic assumption that capital cities have more “homosexual culture” than 
rural towns. While this may well be true in some respects, it rests on a very public 
definition of “homosexual culture”, and one that is more likely to be welcoming to 
gay men with a disposable income than to queer women from outside the city who 
may not have a disposable income (Duggan 2002; Taylor 2007).  
 
Regardless of the outcome of the decision, the very operation of refugee law in the 
context of sexuality superficially confirms the western state’s status as the place of 
modernity, cultural tolerance and political superiority, and that of the country of 
origin’s primitiveness, homophobia and general inferiority (Keenan 2010; Miles 
2010). In reality, the sexual difference that successful sexuality-based refugee claims 
allows is very limited – think of the Spartacus guide example and the specific type of 
homosexuality you need to perform to be recognised by the law. In Jasbir Puar’s 
terms, it is only homonormative applicants whose claims succeed (Puar 2007). 
Developing the idea of homonormativity and homonationalism, Puar (2007) argues in 
the US context that liberal politics have accepted certain queer subjects, but only in a 
                                                 
23 Blanco v Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration) 2001 FCT 727 2001 (Federal Court 
(Canada)) 28 June 2001; Martinez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FC 1005 
2003 (Federal Court (Canada)) 28 August 2003. 
24 JD Zimbabwe [2004] UKIAT 00259 2004 (Immigration Appeal Tribunal). 
25 N98/22074 (1 March 2000) (Refugee Review Tribunal). 
26 N02/44760 (23 May 2003) (Refugee Review Tribunal). 
27 N01/37673 (15 November 2002) (Refugee Review Tribunal). 
28 Ibid. 
29 N98/22074 (1 March 2000) 2000 (Refugee Review Tribunal). 
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very particular and assimilationist way, and in a way that depends on and further 
produces the figure of the implicitly sexually deviant, racialised other (Puar 2007). 
Thus, the happy white gay and lesbian couples from picket fence suburbs who can 
marry and adopt children stand in stark opposition to the monster-terrorist-fag whose 
perversity revolts all good national subjects, straight or queer. Applying this model to 
the refugee context, it can be seen from the cases reviewed in this chapter that the 
masculine, white, middle class criteria which western states impose on all those 
seeking asylum on the basis of sexuality, means that only those who fit into a narrow 
homonormativity are actually allowed through the borders of the nation. Indeed as the 
cases discussed have shown, refugee law applied to queer women from non-western 
states produces an essentialised vulnerable subject that fails to fit the reality of most 
applicants. This vulnerable subject is based on stereotyped ideas about either western 
pink dollar gays and lesbians or foreign women in need, and while its production does 
provide a positive outcome for a handful of individual asylum-seeking subjects, on a 
broader scale, it also reinforces hierarchies of race, gender and sexuality and colonial 
landscapes of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states. It thus directs attention away from more 
difficult questions about how those hierarchies and landscapes might be un-mapped, 
and how new landscapes of belonging might be envisaged and worked towards.  
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